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NOTES
WEAVING THE CLOTH OF SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION: THE ROLE OF DIALOGUE IN
TAILORING JUDICIAL POWER
Shawn Doyle*
INTRODUCTION

"But he doesn't have anything on," exclaimed the child upon observing the emperor.' In Hans Christian Andersen's classic tale, The
Emperor's New Clothes,2 two swindlers came to the court of an emperor
and claimed the ability to weave the most exquisite cloth. This cloth
had a rather unique property though-it was "invisible to any person
who was unfit for his position or inexcusably stupid."3 The emperor
charged the swindlers to fashion new clothes from this cloth for his
upcoming procession. Anxious to hear of the tailors' progress, the
emperor sent members of his court to inspect the tailors' work. Although they could see no cloth, the members of the imperial court
nevertheless exclaimed its delicate and charming character, for they
feared the emperor would deride them as incompetent if they admitted the truth. On the day of the royal procession, the emperor excitedly awaited his new clothes, but, when they arrived, he too could not
see them. Nevertheless, the emperor donned his new clothes because
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.S. Truman State
University, 2004. First and foremost, I would like to thank my family, particularly my
parents, Dennis and Patty, and my friends for their enduring love and support. I
would like to thank Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his ever-helpful advice and counsel.
Katherine D. Spitz, G. David Mathues, and Professor Anthony J. Bellia also provided
invaluable assistance on prior drafts of this Note. Finally, I would like to thank those
many educators and staff members at Sumner Academy of Arts and Science and
Truman State University who truly inspired me to achieve all that I can.
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The Emperor's New Clothes, in FmaRY TALFs 91, 94

(Jackie Wullschlager ed., Tiina Nunnally trans., 2005).
2 Id. at 91-95.
3 Id. at 91.
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if he admitted he could not see
he feared his court would ridicule him
child during the procession,
4
the garments. After the cry of the young
doesn't have anything on!" The
the entire crowd echoed, "But he
5
emperor cringed but continued.
closely, for there may be a
Andersen's tale reminds us to look
This admonition can serve
distinction between rhetoric and reality.
to a most fundamental question of
legal scholars as well. The answer
and judicial branches to conlaw-the relative power of the legislative
of lower federal courts-continues
trol the subject-matter jurisdiction
during the Constitutional Conto elude legal scholars. The debates
na"matters other than the
6 The
vention provide little guidance because
of the delegates' attention."
tional judiciary consumed the bulk
codified as Article III of the
compromise reached by the delegates,
but a mere framework for the
7
Constitution, furthermore, establishes
answer, then, scholars have turned
federal judiciary. In search for an
the Court has done little to resolve
to the Supreme Court. However,
tale, the Supreme Court
this debate. Like the tailors in Andersen's
beautifully tailored jurisprudence
has presented the sovereign with a
little relation to reality.
of congressional supremacy that bares
an analytical framework to
Professor Barry Friedman developed
and resolve this fundamental quessee through the Court's rhetoric
8
two models-congressional power
tion of power. He constructed
between Congress and the
and dialogic-to analyze the interactions
4 Id. at 94-95.
5 Id. at 95.
Jurisdiction,the Rise of Legal Positivism,
6 PatrickJ. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity
L. REv. 79, 90 (1993).
TEX.
72
Klaxon,
and a Brave New World for Erie and
because they were "'unanimatters
other
on
focus
In part, delegates were able to
universal Jurisof a supreme judiciary Tribunal of
mous ...in the Expedy & Necessy
appellate
StatesRevefue&
Nature between
diction-in Controversies of a legal
to Mr. Baldaccording
States,'"
different
foreign or
[sic] Causes between subjects of
JurisdicFriendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
HenryJ.
Georgia.
from
delegate
a
OF
win,
RECORDS
THE
FARRAND,
(1928) (quoting 3 MAX
tion, 41 IJARV. L. Rrv. 483, 486-87
original).
in
(alteration
(1911))
1787, 168, 169-70
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

"judicial Power of the United States,
7 Per the first Section of that Article, the such inferior Courts as the Congress
in
and
shall be vested in one supreme Court,
U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1. Detailing the
may from time to time ordain and establish." Section of Article III reads, in pertithe second
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary,
this Constiextend to all Cases ... arising under
shall
Power
...
nent part, "[t]hejudicial
Authority
their
and Treaties made. .. under
tution, the Laws of the United States,
1.
cl.
2,
§
Id.
of different States."
to Controversies . . . between Citizens
The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Dialogue:
Different
A
8 See Barry Friedman,
[hereinafter Friedman, Different Dialogue];
juisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1990)
Nw. U.
Legal Scholarship: A (Dialogic) Reply, 85
Barry Friedman, FederalJurisdiction and
(Dialogic) Reply].
L. REV. 478 (1991) [hereinafter Friedman,
THE

2006]

WEAVING

THE

CLOTH

OF

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

845

federal judiciary on questions of Article III, generally, and subject-matter jurisdiction of lower federal courts, more particularly. 9 At its most
fundamental level, the congressional power model contends that the
Constitution grants Congress the ultimate authority to determine the
subject-matter jurisdiction of lower federal courts.' 0 In contrast, proponents of the dialogic model predict that a discourse between the coequal judicial and legislative branches determines the actual contours
of lower federal court subject-matterjurisdiction. I 1 Part I of this Note
summarizes Professor Friedman's analytic framework.
The efficacy of these two models may be tested by examining actual interactions between Congress and the federal judiciary. Supplemental jurisdiction' 2 is a particularly fruitful area for investigation.
This area of jurisprudence has evolved for over forty years and has
been particularly active in recent decades. Part II examines the interactions between the judiciary and Congress regarding the proper
scope of supplemental jurisdiction.
After Congress enacted a supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, disputes quickly arose between the circuit courts as to
its effect on the scope of supplemental jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court sought to resolve this question in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc.'3 The Court's approach to dealing with Congress's interjection into this area provides a window into the Court's view of its
power to affect subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's reasoning in Allapattah.
The Court's supplemental jurisdiction jurisprudence provides
several examples of a divergence between rhetoric and action. By focusing on the Court's reasoning as opposed to its rhetoric, evidence
for the Court's true conception of its own power can be found. In the
end, the interactions of the Court and Congress provide evidence in
support of the dialogic model.
9 Professor Friedman fails to consider a "judicial power model" in his analysis.
Supporters of this model would, presumably, argue that the judiciary has the superior
position when determining lower federal court subject-matter jurisdiction.
10 See infra Part I.A.
11 See infra Part I.C.
12 The author of this Note uses the term "supplemental jurisdiction" merely as
shorthand for pendent and ancillary jurisdictions. But see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2621 (2005) ("Nothing in § 1367 indicates a
congressional intent to recognize, preserve, or create some meaningful, substantive
distinction between the jurisdictional categories we have historically labeled pendent
and ancillary.").
13 125 S.Ct. 2611. Because Allapattah is a diversity class action, this Note will not
discuss § 1367's interaction with other forms ofjurisdiction, such as federal question
jurisdiction.
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Part IV, then, summarizes the insights into the Court's jurisprudence and the dialogic model that the analysis in this Note brings to
the fore.
I.

THE MODELS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Legal scholars generally accept the premise that Article III grants
Congress power over the jurisdiction of lower federal courts.1 4 The
debate, therefore, focuses on the relative power of Congress and the
federal judiciary to determine the final scope of subject-matter jurisdiction. Professor Friedman offers two models to explain the process
of determining jurisdiction-congressional power and dialogic. This
15
Part summarizes Professor Friedman's analytical approach.
A.

CongressionalPower Model

The congressional power model is an aggregation of several interpretations of Article III. At base, the premise that Congress has the
power to set the final scope of federal jurisdiction within constitutional bounds joins these interpretations. 16 In other words, Congress
has the power to circumscribe the scope of the judicial power. Accordingly, federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction if there is both
a constitutional grant and a congressional authorization. "Constitutional power is merely the first hurdle that must be overcome in determining that a federal court has jurisdiction over a particular
controversy. For the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not
14 See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 BYU L. REv. 75, 76-79 (noting that some scholars "have argued that a
'plenary' power in Congress to meddle with the courts is an aspect of constitutional
'checks and balances,' and there are some Supreme Court dicta exhibiting what one
observer described as 'an almost unseemly enthusiasm in discussing Congress' power
to lop off diverse heads of ... [A]rticle III jurisdiction'" (footnotes omitted)). Given
that Professor Friedman suggests that both Congress and the federal judiciary create
the contours of lower court jurisdiction, the dialogic model would also endorse this
statement.

15 As Professor Friedman notes, this discussion joins two different, but related,
questions. See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 5-10. The first question
concerns the authority of Congress to allocate jurisdiction to federal courts and the
limits on that authority. Id. The second question centers on the permissibility of
courts to decline to exercise that jurisdiction authorized by Congress. Id.
16 Proponents of the congressional power model acknowledge that extra-Article
III provisions such as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment also limit Congress's power. See RicR-A.RD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 335 (5th ed.
2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLERI]; Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at
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only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts
of Congress.' 7
The limited divergence among the different permutations of the
congressional power model centers on the constraints that Article III
itself places on the power of Congress to affect the scope of subjectmatter jurisdiction. One permutation-the "strong" congressional
power model-contends Article III places no constraints on Congress's power.' 8 This reading of Article III suggests that the power to
create lower federal courts granted to Congress in the Tribunals
Clause 19 necessarily grants Congress the plenary power to control inferior courts, including "prescribing and circumscribing subject matter jurisdiction [and] dictating details of procedure, evidence, and
remedies."2 0 Supporters of this proposition look to the 1850 Supreme
Court decision in Sheldon v. Sill.2l There, the Court stated, "Congress
may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no ju22
risdiction but such as the statute confers."
Another permutation of this model-"mandatory" congressional
power-is most closely associated with the arguments proffered byJus17
18
19

Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 31.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be

vested in ...

such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and

establish.").
Professor Friedman notes that the strong variant also relies on the Exception
Clause of Article III to permit almost unlimited congressional control over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 35-36.
However, a discussion of this concept is outside of the scope of this Note.
20 Engdahl, supra note 14, at 105. Proponents of the strong model argue, in part,
that the principle of federalism supports this view of the Tribunal Clause. As Professor Friedman argues, "[u]nder the strong congressional control model, a state court
is at least as good as, if not better than, a federal court with regard to protecting
constitutional rights. According to the strong model proponents, state courts are the
,primary guarantors of constitutional rights.'" Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note
8, at 37 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953)). Accordingly, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky proposes that division of jurisdiction between
state and federal courts is a policy decision properly considered by Congress. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 600-01 (1991). See
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary,
36 UCLA L. REv. 233, 233-35 (1988) (summarizing the history of the parity debate).
Professor Friedman takes issue with this assertion because of the continuing debate over the parity between federal and state courts. See Friedman, Different Dialogue,
supra note 8, at 37 & n.196.
21 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
22 Id. at 449.
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According to "mandatory" scholars,
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tion of lower federal courts
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supra note 8, at 40-48. While this
23 See Friedman, Different Dialogue,
at 39-40;
id.
See
exist.
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two versions of the mandatory argument,
24.
note
note 16, at 342-44; infra
HART & WECHSLER, supra
Justice Story believed that the Constitution
24 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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on Congress. "If, then, it is a duty
may place an even greater burden
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vest the judicial power of the United
is imperative
part,
one
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is too
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However, Article III does not impose such a limitation on Congress's
power over the second class of controversies.2 6 Much like the "strong"
congressional power model proponents, then, "mandatory" scholars
believe Article III grants Congress final authority over the scope of
subject-matter jurisdiction for lower federal courts-at least, over the
second class of jurisdictional grants.
While "mandatory" and "strong" theorists disagree over Congress's power to authorize certain of the specified cases and controversies, they both acknowledge Congress's wide latitude to control the
scope of those subject matters over which it has discretion.
B.

The Problem of Discretion

In conjunction with the congressional power model, Professor
Friedman considers the obligation of courts to exercise congressionally authorized subject-matter jurisdiction. 27 Professor Friedman argues that the discretionary school of thought, which is most closely
associated with Professor David Shapiro, assumes congressional
supremacy over subject-matterjurisdiction. 28 Hence, he places Professor Shapiro's school within the congressional power model.
According to Professor Shapiro, federal courts exercise discretion
when they determine whether or not to hear a case.2 9 A court exercises discretion when it declines to hear a case for which it has jurisdiction, or, more subtly, when it interprets a jurisdictional statute not to
authorize judicial power over the subject matter of the case.30 Yet, the
26 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 343-44; Amar,
Reply to Professor Friedman, supra note 25, at 446-50.
27 See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 8-9.
28 See id. Professor Friedman summarizes the various perspectives in this debate
as two schools-obligation and discretion. The first school "maintains that federal
courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation' to exercise the jurisdiction granted
them by Congress." Id. at 8 & n.31. Champions of this school include Chief Justice
John Marshall and Professors Martin Redish and Philip Kurland. Id. at 8. In fact,
Chief Justice Marshall thought it would be treasonous for a court to decline to exercise congressionally authorized subject-matterjurisdiction. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 543 (1985). The second school accords
.much greater discretion to the federal courts to decide in which cases jurisdiction
will be exercised." Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 8.
29 See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 543-45. Professor Shapiro notes that there are
two forms of discretion-normative and allocative. "Normative discretion is discretion delegated to a rulemaking or adjudicative body by the legislature, while allocative
discretion refers to delegation of decision-making authority within a particular hierarchy (here, the judiciary)." Id. at 546. Professor Shapiro focuses on normative
discretion.
30 See id. at 561-62. Neither the Constitution nor jurisdictional statutes necessarily provide the authority for the court to exercise this discretion. Instead, "as experi-
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power to exercise this disfederal judiciary does not have unbridled
is conferred ...there is at least a
cretion. Initially, "when jurisdiction
'principle of preference' that a court should entertain and resolve on
3
the jurisdictional grant." '
of
scope
the
within
its merits an action
according to Professor ShaWhen declining to exercise jurisdiction,
concerns such as federalpiro, the court should look to countervailing
32 However,
administration.
ism, separation of powers, and judicial
grant, the historical context in
"the language of the [jurisdictional]
common law tradition behind it"
which the grant was made, or the
even to the point of elimican expand or reduce a court's discretion,
legislaappears to support the 34
nation.3 3 Professor Shapiro, therefore,
model.
power
the congressional
tive supremacy envisioned by
Professor Shapiro's
Professor Friedman too quickly disregards
in the edifice of the congresdiscretionary school as another brick
35 As shown in Parts III and IV, the line between
sional power model.
be difficult to discern.
discretion and dialogue can, at times,
C.

The Dialogic Model

power model, Professor
As an alternative to the congressional
36
At its most fundamental
Friedman constructed the dialogic model.
"[A]rticle III means what it
level, the dialogic model asserts that
T
interact. 37 Likewise, the
comes to mean as the Court and Congress
and
whether a court must exercise jurisdiction
ence and tradition teach, the question
gross.
in
answer
to
is difficult, if not impossible,
resolve a controversy on its merits
tuning
adapted to engage in the necessary fine
better
And the courts are functionally
powers
inherent
the
to
similar
is
This argument
than is the legislature." Id. at 574.
model. See infra note 45.
dialogic
the
for
offers
Note
this
argument
omitted).
(footnotes
575
at
31 Shapiro, supra note 28,
strikingly similar to those offered
are
factors
these
of
Some
32 See id. at 579-88.
47.
by Professor Friedman. See infra note
33 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 575.
34 See id. at 575-76.
that "this obviously is a tricky question
35 Professor Friedman even acknowledges
Diacontrol approach." Friedman, Different
within the context of the congressional
logue, supra note 8, at 8.
note 8, at 478 ("At bottom, what [Professor
36 Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply, supra
that has
to challenge the nature of the debate
Friedman] hoped to accomplish was
Constituthe
power] virtually since the time of
occurred on this subject [of relative
first, the
grew out of frustration at two levels:
tion's framing. [His] original article
were
they
is,
that
incorrect,
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framed
second,
and
question;
the
on
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not an accurate description of the 'data'
but to and fro, while interesting quesanywhere
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was
debate
the
as it was,
tions remained unanswered.").
of
is the most reasonable interpretation
37 Id. at 489. "The dialogic approach
the
of
text
the
harmonizing
of
job
the best
[A] rticle III precisely because it does
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federal judiciary determines
'8
interaction between Congress and the
jurisdiction. The
the scope of lower federal courts' subject-matter leaves unresolved
Friedman,
Constitution, according to Professor
federal jurisdiction and, concontrolling
"how far Congress may go in
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the scope of federal jurisdiction."
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4
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gress, of course, may enact jurisdictional
concernof that text, and policy arguments
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Friedman, Difjurisdiction."
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control
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ferent Dialogue, supra note 8, at 29.
supra note 8, at 478.
38 See Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply,
execunote 8, at 48. In the context of the
39 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra
is not
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tive and legislative powers, the Court
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See,
to the vagaries of circumstance.
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J., concurU.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,
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power
of the judiciary's
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be similarly uncertain should not be
of being
it means that these criteria are capable
28, at 578-79 ("Of equal importance,
work,
courts'
the
of
critics
by
courts, evaluated
articulated and openly applied by the
which
candor,
of
requirement
The elemental
and reviewed by the legislative branch.
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Friedman
supra note 8, at 50-51. Professor
40 See Friedman, Different Dialogue,
models
power
and mandatory congressional
chastises the proponents of the strong
FriedSee
other.
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to
their variant superior
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41 See Friedman, Different
limiting
for
justification
weak
a
would provide
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42 See id. at 53.
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43
1367; the judiciary asserts itself through the adjudication of cases.
Professor Friedman illustrates a possible interaction between the two
branches:

[1]f Congress tries to so curtail the Supreme Court's jurisdiction,
and if the Court acquiesces, then the [Court's jurisdiction is curtailed] -at least (and only) for the time being .... But, if the Court
resists, either by holding the limitation unconstitutional, or (as is
more likely) by construing its way around the statute . . . the

[Court's jurisdiction would not be curtailed]i-at least so long as
44
Congress goes along with the Court's construction.
Importantly, the logic underlying Professor Friedman's model necessitates acceptance of the possibility that the order of this example
could be reversed. Per the dialogic model, the federal judiciary has a
fount of independent power by which it may act.45 Because the Court
43 The federal judiciary impacts the scope of lower-court, subject-matter jurisdiction with both its procedural and substantive decisions. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 17-22 (1973) (discussing the impact of judicial
interpretations of substantive rights on the scope ofjurisdiction); Friedman, Different
Dialogue, supra note 8, at 52-53 (discussing the courts' role in defining substantive
rights). The "pure 'judicial power' consists of applying pre-existing law to the facts in
a particular case, then rendering a final, binding judgment." Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the StructuralConstitution,86 IoWA L. REV. 735,
844 (2001). If the duty of the federal courts, then, is "to decide a properly presented
case in accordance with the law," Shapiro, supra note 28, at 579, they must make a
critical determination-whether or not they have jurisdiction to hear the case.
44 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supranote 8, at 48-49. Because this Note focuses
on the subject-matter jurisdiction of lower federal courts, this example is simply illustrative of the dialogic process.
Professor Amar criticizes the underlying foundation of the dialogic model when
it is applied to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. "Friedman's 'dialogue' rests on a
reading of the text that requires a Supreme Court with some undiminishable jurisdiction. (Friedman's 'flexible' dialogue thus reads the text [of the Constitution] as
'fixed' and 'immutable,' at least to this extent.)" Amar, Reply to Professor Friedman,
supra note 25, at 446. After all, without such an assumption, "Congress could silence
the Court by stripping it of all jurisdiction ... or better still, by eliminating the Court
altogether." Id. As noted by Professor Friedman, however, such a "dooms-day" scenario has yet to occur in the history of the United States. See infra note 49.
45 While not raised by Professor Friedman, courts could reference inherent
power. Though the federal courts have never reconciled their claim of inherent
power with the Constitution, they have continually asserted power to control their
dockets. Pushaw, supra note 43, at 760-61, 783-86 (2001). Judge Friendly urged:
If even [modest reform of diversity jurisdiction] . . . cannot be enacted with
more than deliberate speed, I see no reason why busy district courts should
not promulgate rules that . . . all other proceedings shall be preferred for
trial over actions where federal jurisdiction is invoked solely on the basis that
the parties are citizens of different states ....
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via the legislative process,
can disregard Congress's will as expressed
formality; federal courts need
the enactment of a statute is but a mere
will. Any resulting congresnot act as servants to the congressional
therefore, be read as tacit apsional silence after the Court acts may,the judiciary's conduct.4 6
at least, of
proval, for the time being

by the congressional
Free from the deferential role envisioned
policy detersubstantive
own
their
power model, courts may interject
of subject-matter jurisdiction.
minations into debates over the scope
47
of choice. They may choose
In other words, courts have the power
and further that branch's polto cooperate with the legislative branch
the two branches can devolve
icy goals, or the interaction between
in which the branches resist
into "an elaborate game of 'push-shove,'
jurisdiction is
views of when the exercise of federal
one another's
''48
appropriate.
no entity exists to arbitrate
Because the branches are coequal,
environment in conjunction
disputes between the two. The political
arguments determines the
with the relative strength of each branch's

of docket control mechanisms to marginalize
FRIENDLY, supra note 43, 152. The use
be
in spite of congressional intent would
certain, undesirable types of jurisdiction
consistent with the dialogic approach.
71 and
supra note 8, at 48-49. See infra note
46 See Friedman, Different Dialogue,
accompanying text for another example.
note 8, at 52-55. In his original work,
47 See Friedman, Dfferent Dialogue, supra
courts may examine when determining
factors
Professor Friedman identifies several
comity
protection of federal rights and interests,
questions of jurisdiction, including:
at 52.
Id.
uniformity.
for
need
resources, and
and federalism, caseloads and judicial
ought
Friedman asserts "the Supreme Court
In support of this position, Professor
over
much authority and expertise as Congress
to-and does-possess at least as
[these] factors." Id.
and the conduct of the federal govAccording to critics, questions of federalism
as opcitizenry via their elected representatives
ernment should be decided by the
governments
state
protects
supremacy
posed to unelected judges. Congressional
aggrandize their power at the expense
will
courts
federal
the
that
against "the danger
Role in Setting the Scope of Federal
Paramount
of the states." Michael Wells, Congress's
As discussed below, see infra Part Ill.B,
Jurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. REv. 465, 467 (1991).
defeared that the federal courts would
many members of the founding generation
enactments
Congressional
courts.
role of state
stroy or, at least, severely undercut the
this
constrain the federal judiciary unless
should
which
citizenry,
the
of
will
reflect the
of the Constitution.
constraint would violate another provision
8, at 49.
note
48 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra
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outcome of the dispute. 49 In the end, Congress and the judiciary will
50
reach an equilibrium point on the particular question at issue.
To support this predicted interaction, Professor Friedman relies
heavily on data describing the actual interaction between the two
branches and normative rationales. 5 1 Professor Friedman asserts that
the dialogic model provides an "accurate description of the 'data'
bearing on the question" of the relative power of the judiciary and
Congress.52 While Professor Friedman cites several examples to support his hypothesis,5 3 as will be shown in Parts II and III, the history of
supplemental jurisdiction lends strong support to the dialogic model.
Professor Friedman additionally argues that the flexibility embedded
in the dialogic model promotes respect between the legislative and
judicial branches. This freedom of action promotes caution, discourages overreaching, and allows for flexibility as times and circum49 See id. at 54-55. Professor Friedman notes that "for two hundred years, these
ultimate crises have, by and large, been avoided." Id. at 55. In the rare instances in
which the process has "broken down," such as the Roosevelt Court-packing plan, the
failure is often more the result of one branch taking the other branch's decision as
being final. See id. Professor Friedman also notes, however, that the flexibility for
each branch in this system can often help prevent these "break downs." See id. at 57.
50 Id. at 56 ("The dialogue does not suggest that the process of defining jurisdiction is completely open-ended ... Congress inevitably will enact a number ofjurisdictional statutes, and the Court and federal courts generally will put them into
operation. Over time certain patterns emerge, and it becomes somewhat easier to
predict what the reaction of either branch will be."). Thus, dialogue typically occurs
on the fringes of jurisdiction or when one branch takes uncharacteristically drastic
action. See id.
"If everything truly is open," critics contend, "we have interpretive nihilism and
chaos, not an 'enduring framework."' Amar, Reply to ProfessorFriedman, supra note 25,
at 443.
51 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supranote 8, at 29 ("The dialogic approach is the
most reasonable interpretation of [A] rticle III precisely because it does the bestjob of
harmonizing the text of the Constitution, the judicial interpretation of that text, and
policy arguments concerning which branch should maintain control over federal
jurisdiction.").
52 Friedman, (Dialogic)Reply, supranote 8, at 478; see also FRIENDLY, supra note 43,
at 22 (noting that individuals increasingly look to federal courts instead of Congress
to supply legal reforms).
53 For examples cited by Professor Friedman in support of this contention, see
Friedman, Different Dialogue, supranote 8, at 10-28. As an illustration, Professor Friedman cites the seeming inconsistent treatment of the complete diversity and amountin-controversy requirements in Supreme Tribe ofBen-Hurv. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921),
and Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Congressional power proponents criticize Professor Friedman's interpretation of some of the cases used to support his argument. See Amar, Reply to Professor Friedman, supra note 25, at 448-50;
Wells, supra note 47, at 468-70.
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4 Furthermore, the federal judiciary is "more
stances change.
refining jurisdictional decisions," accordcompetent than Congress in
5 5 In practice, Congress simply cannot6 aning to Professor Friedman.
before or even after they arise.5
jurisdiction
of
questions
all
swer
III, then, Professor Friedman
Because of the ambiguity of Article
and the federal judiciary
looks to the actual interactions of Congress
when interpreting that Article
and normative principles for guidance
5 7 Based on these observations and principles,
of the Constitution.
predicts that the interactions beProfessor Friedman's dialogic model
determine the final scope of
58
tween Congress and the federal judiciary

jurisdiction.
lower-court, subject-matter

power models may be
Though the dialogic and congressional
the dialogic model conceptually
seen as competing with each other,
the
congressional intent envisioned by
incorporates the deference to
act
to
freedom
9
5
For a court may have
congressional power model.
freedom. If a court chooses to
and, yet, choose not to exercise that
for instance, its reasoning
defer to congressional pronouncements,
by congressional power propowould likely appear similar to that used
congressional intent, therenents. Examples of courts going beyond
the accuracy of the dialogic
fore, will be critical in determining
model.
debate between legal scholWhile no single note will resolve the
interactions between Congress and
ars, a detailed examination of the
debate by providing evidence to
the federal judiciary can advance the
history of supplemental jurisdicsupport one model or the other. The
of Congress's supplemental
tion and the Court's recent assessment
fertile ground for such an
jurisdiction statute in Allapattah provide
examination.
dialogic apsupra note 8, at 57-58. "The
54 See Friedman, Different Dialogue,
them.
facilitates
actually
but
such changing norms,
proach . .. not only has room for
in the joints to
play
sufficient
has
the Constitution
The dialogic approach recognizes
smoothly." Id. at 48.
operating
system
federal
keep the
55 Id. at 60.

56

See id.

57

text.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying
text.
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying

58
and
of the comparison between a square
59 These models remind the author
four
and
length
a shape with four sides of equal
rectangle in geometry. A square is
length and four
with corresponding sides of equal

right angles. A rectangle is a shape
need not be a
always a rectangle, but a rectangle
right angles. Thus, a square is

square.
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SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION: THE PRELUDE TO ALL4PATTAH

The interaction between Congress and the federal judiciary over
the scope of the courts' supplemental jurisdiction provides strong evidence in support of Professor Friedman's dialogic model. Prior to
1989, supplemental jurisdiction was largely a creature ofjudicial creation;6 0 Congress remained conspicuously absent from the debate.
The Supreme Court questioned this regime in its 1989 decision, Finley
v. United States.6' Subsequently, Congress interjected itself into the
area with the Judicial Improvements Act of 199062 codified, in perti-

nent part, at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The circuit courts quickly diverged
over the impact of § 1367 on the Supreme Court's earlier jurisprudence. 63 This Part will briefly recount the history of supplemental jurisdiction and examine the evidence it provides for the dialogic
model. The Supreme Court finally resolved the dispute among the
circuits in Allapattah,which is examined in the subsequent Part of this
Note.

A.

The Judicial Foundation of Supplemental jurisdiction

The modern era 64 of the Court's jurisprudence began with United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs 5 in 1966. This case raised a fundamental ques60 Section 1367 codified the previous concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as "supplemental jurisdiction." H.R. RrP. No. 101-734, at 27 (1990), as reprinted

in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6873.
61

490 US. 545 (1989); see also I FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND
(1990).

SUBcOMMiTEE REPORTS 552

62 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat, 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
63 Richard D. Freer, The CauldronBoils: SupplementalJurisdiction,Amount in Controversy, andDiversity of Citizenship Class Actions, 53 EMORY L.J. 55, 58 (2004) ("Five courts
of appeals-the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-adopting a
largely 'textual' perspective, have concluded Zahn [v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S.
291 (1973),] is dead. Three-the Third, Eight, and Tenth Circuits-adopting two
distinct approaches, have concluded that Zahn lives." (footnotes omitted)).
64 See Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and HamperingDiversity: Life After
Finley and the Supplemental JurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY LJ. 445, 449-50, 453 (1991)
("[T]he Supreme Court had endorsed supplemental jurisdiction for over a century
before Gibbs.").
65 383 U.S. 715 (1966). This seminal case dealt specifically with the scope of pendent-claim jurisdiction. Id. at 721. "Pendent [claim] jurisdiction, in the sense ofjudicial power, exists whenever there is a [federal question] claim.., and the relationship
between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action
before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.'" Id. at 725. See generally
CHEMERNSKY, supranote 25, § 5.4, at 331-32 (summarizing scope of pendentjurisdiction); FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61, at 546 (same); Freer, supra note 64,

at 447-48 (same).
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court deliver judgment on a
tion of judicial power-may a federal
the same transaction as the federal
state law claim that arises from
on its analysis, the Supreme
claim then being adjudicated? Based
be resolved more efficiently and
Court concluded that claims could
parties if a federal court adjudicates
with greater convenience to the
66
before it. If a federal court otherboth the federal and state claims
as a
one of the claims raised, it may,
wise has jurisdiction over at least
claims
supplemental jurisdiction over those

result of Gibbs, exercise
basis ofjurisdiction. The Court limfor which it lacks an independent
claims that constitute one constituited this authorization to those
as all claims deriving "from a
tional case, which the Court defined
67
the Court permitted

fact." Moreover,
common nucleus of operative
supplediscretion in their exercise of
lower federal courts6 to employ
mental jurisdiction.
Congress did not comment on
For over two decades after Gibbs,
jurisprudence, and the Court
the Court's supplemental jurisdiction authorization of supplemental
"never addressed the need for statutory
for] claims
can be understood as jurisdiction
"In contrast, ancillary jurisdiction
meet
independently
original complaint that do not
at
5.4,
that are asserted after thefiling of the
§
25,
note
supra
jurisdiction." CHEMERNSKY,
thirdthe requirements for federal court
and
involves claims between defendants
331-32. Ancillary jurisdiction typically
intervencounterclaim,
a
to
response
in
plaintiff
party defendants or claims by the
jurisdiction
diversity
in
occurs by-and-large
tion, or the like. This type of jurisdiction
supra note 61, at 546, 550-52 (summaCOMM.,
STUDY
cases. See generally FED. CoURTS
(same);
Freer, supra note 64, at 448-49
rizing the scope of ancillary jurisdiction);
Sympathetic
a
for
and Section 1367: The Case
James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction
(same). The Court has not allowed
(1999)
134-35
109,
Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
diversity
such a point as to endanger the complete
ancillary jurisdiction to expand to
437 U.S.
Kroger,
v.
Co.
Erection
&
Owen Equip.
rule for diversity jurisdiction. See
deliberately
was concerned that plaintiffs would
Court
Owen
The
(1978).
365, 377
against a
suit
bringing
not
rule by intentionally
circumvent the complete diversity
non-dithe
implead
would
that the defendant
non-diverse party with the intention
third-party
then assert a claim against the now
verse party. Id. The plaintiff could
defendant. Id.
66 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
67 Id. at 725.
a logifederal courts traditionally look for
In the context of ancillary jurisdiction,
additional
the
and
jurisdiction
that has original
that
cal relationship between the claim
the Supreme Court has recognized
However,
376.
at
U.S.
437
Owen,
Id.
claim. See
problem."
generic
are "two species of the same
of
ancillary and pendent jurisdictions
nucleus
test-common
the pendent-claim
note
at 370. Thus, scholars have interpreted
supra
CHEMERINSKY,
See
ancillary jurisdiction.
operative facts-to also apply to
25, § 5.4, at 331.
the federal
judicial economy, substantiality of
68 Federal courts can consider
hear
should
they
if
to litigants to determine
question, and convenience and fairness
726.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
the additional pendent claim.
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jurisdiction." 69 Thus, many legal scholars concluded that supplemental jurisdiction needed no statutory base but, instead, rested upon
some sufficient common law tradition. 70 Gibbs and its progeny represent a repudiation of the congressional power model. Congress
cannot occupy the superior position envisioned by the congressional
power model if the Supreme Court may embark upon the seemingly
common-law analysis it employed in Gibbs. Instead, the Court's ac71
tions lend credence to the dialogic model.
However, the Court struck a blow at the foundation of its prior
jurisprudence in Finley v. United States. 72 The Court argued:
It remains rudimentary law that "[ajs regards all courts of the
United States inferior to [the Supreme Court], two things are necessary to create jurisdiction .... The Constitution must have given to
the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have

supplied it.... To the extent that such action is not taken, the power
73
lies dormant.
While explicitly refusing to overturn Gibbs,74 the Court lambasted
its previous jurisprudence for "not mention[ing], let alone com[ing]
to grips with, the text of the jurisdictional statutes and the bedrock
principle that federal courts have no jurisdiction without statutory authorization."7 5 To reconcile Gibbs with the "rudimentary law" of jurisdiction, the Court read the jurisdictional statutes as broadly
authorizing federal courts to dispose of an entire constitutional case at
one time.76 The Finley Court steadfastly refused to extend this reading
to other areas not covered by its previous precedents.7 7 The Court
reminded the legislative branch:
69

Freer, supra note 63, at 453.

70

Id.

71 This is an example of the silence as a form of acceptance discussed in Part I.
72 E.g., FED. COuRTS STuDY COMM., supra note 61, at 552.
73 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547-48 (1989) (first alteration and second omission in original) (quoting The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252

(1868)).
74 Id. at 556 ("As we noted at the outset, our cases do not display an entirely
consistent approach with respect to the necessity that jurisdiction be explicitly conferred. The Gibbs line of cases was a departure from prior practice, and a departure
that we have no intent to limit or impair.").
75 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2617 (2005) (citing Finley, 490 U.S. at 548); see also H.R. RFP. No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6874
(summarizing Finley's holding).
76 See Finley, 490 U.S. at 549.
77 Id. Finley specifically dealt with pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. This type of
jurisdiction "permits a plaintiff to join to a federal claim a factually related state claim
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Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a
particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. What is of
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a
background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the ef78
fect of the language it adopts.

"If Finley is correct," some scholars argued, "the federal courts are
engaging in a systematic, unlawful grabbingof subject-matter jurisdiction that goes to the very heart of our federal structure." 7 3 These
scholars clearly viewed Finley as a repudiation of the logical underpinnings of the Court's previous jurisprudence and a strong affirmation
of the congressional power model. As examined in Part IV, this common reading of Finley is likely incorrect in the light of the Court's total
supplemental jurisdiction jurisprudence.
B.

Section 1367 and Its Gaping Holes °

Congress responded to Finley's invitation by authorizing supplemental jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. § 1367.81 Though Congress
purported to affect little change via its enactment,8 2 controversy
quickly erupted over the precise meaning and effect of the new statute. 13 This Note will not enter the decade-long debate over the effects
of § 1367 on supplemental jurisdiction. Rather, this history is recounted in order to provide background for the discussion of Allapatinvolving an additional, non-diverse party." FED. COURTS STUDY

COMM.,

supra note 61,

at 546.
78 Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. Such a result would undermine the complete diversity
rule.
79 FED, COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61, at 556 (emphasis added); see also
Pfander, supra note 65, at 156-57 ("With its emphasis on the necessity for written
authority, the Finley Court made what some have seen as a decisive break with the
past. On this account, Finley brought to a close the free-wheeling jurisdictional days
of Gibbs and inaugurated an era of close attention to statutory text.").
80 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About
SupplementalJurisdiction?A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 961 n.91 (1991)
("We can only hope that the federal courts will plug that potentially gaping hole in
the complete diversity requirement . .

").

81 See H.R. RE. No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6874.
82 Id.
83 For a review of the debate over § 1367, see Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Co., 166 F.3d 214, 220 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999). See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Would the Kroger Rule Survive the ALI's Proposed Revision of § 1367, 51 DUKE L.J.
647 (2001) (outlining the judicial response to Congress's enactment of § 1367 and
the probable effect of the ALI's proposed revision); Pfander, supra note 65 (proposing a reading of § 1367 that accounts for both legislative history and textual
consideration).
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tah in Part III and to examine the interactions between Congress and
the judiciary.
1. Congress Responds to Finley
Turning first to the text of § 1367, the statute is composed of
three major subsections. Section 1367(a) represents a broad grant of
supplemental jurisdiction. 84 Section 1367(b) limits that grant ofjurisdiction when the court's original jurisdiction is founded upon the parties' diversity of citizenship. Particularly, supplemental jurisdiction
shall not extend
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule
14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [("Group
One")], or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 ... or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under
Rule 24 [ ("Group Two")] ...

when exercising supplemental juris-

diction would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements
of section 1332. 85

The authors of § 1367 designed subsection (b) to prevent parties
from circumventing the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. 6 Section 1367(c) grants courts discretion in their exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction. Scholars have generally interpreted this subsection as an
authorization for the same broad grant of discretion sanctioned by the
87
Supreme Court in Gibbs.
There is little evidence whether or not Congress was consciously
acting under the congressional power or dialogic model in either the
statute's text or its legislative history. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Congress accepted Finley's critique of the Court's previous
reasoning, there is little warrant for pause. As seen in the discussion
of the dialogic model, both Congress and the judiciary can assert various justifications for their respective actions. Critically, however, Congress in fact established a dialogue with the Court over the proper
scope of supplemental jurisdiction by enacting § 1367. Congress both
lent its imprimatur to the previously sanctioned scope of supplemental jurisdiction and encouraged the exercise of even broader jurisdiction than the Court was willing to accept in Finley.
84 "[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that
are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they

form part of the same case or controversy ....
85
86

87

"

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).

28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
See H.R. REp. No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6874.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 926-28.
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Gaping Holes

Nonetheless, omissions in § 1367(b) caused confusion among the
circuit courts. One of these apparent oversights was Congress's failure
to include Rule 20 in Group One. The authors of the statute acknowledged that, read literally, this failure permits circumvention of the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.88 To overcome the drafting
error, the authors of the statute urged federal courts to "plug that
potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity requirement--either
by regarding it as an unacceptable circumvention of original diversity
requirements, or by reference to the intent not to abandon the complete diversity rule that is clearly expressed in the legislative history of
section 1367."' 9
Another omission, this time from Group Two of § 1367(b), is
Rule 23, which governs federal class actions. Prior to § 1367, the Supreme Court held in Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo.90 that a member of
a Rule 23 diversity class action must independently satisfy the amountin-controversy requirement in order for a federal court to hear that
class member's claim. 9 1 The statute's legislative history indicates that
92
Congress and the statute's authors did not intend to overturn Zahn.
88 See Rowe et al., supra note 80, at 961 n.91 ("Literally, though, section 1367(b)
does not bar an original complete diversity filing and subsequent amendment to add
a nondiverse co-plaintiff under Rule 20, taking advantage of supplemental jurisdiction over the claim of the new plaintiff against the existing defendant."). A nondiverse party, for example, could join as a plaintiff after the original cause was filed.
89 Id.; see also H.R. RP No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6874-75 & n.17.
As noted previously, a circuit split developed over the proper interpretation of
§ 1367. Those circuits that relied on the text of § 1367(b) would likely decline the
invitation to read Rule 20 into the statute. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
333 F.3d 1248, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2003), affd sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611; Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-19 (4th Cir.
2001); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997); In re
Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court sub
nom. Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
The logic of those circuits that reliedjointly on the text of §§ 1367(a) and (b)
and/or legislative history would likely plug the hole. See Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist
Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 133-39 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct.
2611; Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare Inc. v.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218-22 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar
Co., 160 F.3d 631, 637-41 (10th Cir. 1998).
90 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
91 Id. at 301. For complete diversity, conversely, a court need only look at the
citizenship of the named plaintiffs as opposed to each individual plaintiff. See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
92 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6875 & n.17.
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However, scholars and the authors of the statute acknowledged that
93
the text, read literally, abrogates the Court's holding in that case.
Whether, in fact, § 1367 overrules Zahn has also generated much disa94
greement among the circuit courts.

3.

Dueling Interpretations of § 1367

In the decade following the enactment of § 1367, the circuit
courts adopted two methods of interpreting the statute. Some courts
relied on the text of the statute, and others relied on its legislative
history.
a.

The Textualist Approach

Those circuits utilizing textualism relied on the express language
of § 1367 to conclude that Congress intended to reject Zahn's interpretation of the amount-in-controversy requirement. The Fifth Circuit adopted this method of analysis in In re Abbott Laboratories.9 5
There, the court examined the amount-in-controversy requirement in
the context of Rule 23 diversity class actions. 96 The Fifth Circuit
grudgingly acknowledged that legislative history signaled no intent on
the part of Congress to overturn Zahn.97 Nevertheless, the court refused to consider this history because it believed the statute to be unambiguous. 98 The court found, consequently, that the statute
overturns Zahn.9 9
The Seventh Circuit extended the logic of Abbott Laboratories to
Rule 20joinder in StrombergMetal Works, Inc. v. PressMechanical, Inc. 0 0
However, the court went further and acknowledged what the authors
of the section feared, that § 1367 "has the potential to move from
complete to minimal diversity." 0 1
93 See Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 527 n.5; Freer, supra note 64, at 485; Rowe et al.,
supra note 80, at 961 n.91.
94 See infra Part II.B.3.
95 51 F.3d 524.
96 Id. at 526.
97 Id. at 528.
98 Id. at 528-29 ("IT]he statute is the sole repository of congressional intent
where the statute is clear and does not demand an absurd result.").
99 Id. at 529.
100 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996). Although Zahn applied to class actions, the
Third and Seventh Circuits have held that Zahn applies equally to Rule 20 joinder.
Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337 (1969)); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., 77 F.3d at 931.
101 Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., 77 F.3d at 932. If diversity exists between at least
one plaintiff and the defendants, non-diverse plaintiffs could then join under Rule 20,
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The Legislative History Approach

chose to examine the statConversely, a minority of circuit courts
concluded that § 1367 does
ute's legislative history and, subsequently,
of the amount-in-controversy renot repudiate Zahn's interpretation
Inc. v. St. Paul
10 2
The Third Circuit's decision in Meritcare
quirement.
03
this approach. As with Stromberg,
Mercury Insurance Co.' exemplifies
amount-in-controversy rule in the
the Third Circuit examined10 4the
The Meritcare court found, however,
context of Rule 20 joinder.
legislain [§ 1367] to make resort to the
"there is sufficient ambiguity
that
held
10 5 Based on this history, the court
10 6
tive history appropriate."
to abrogate Zahn.
Congress did not intend
07
Sugar Co. 1 embarked
Western
v.
Leonhardt
in
Circuit
0
The Tenth
textualism"' "sympathetic
as
path-known
on a slightly different
this
statute's legislative history guides
when it analyzed § 1367, but the
functions
.10 9 This approach focuses on the different
method as well
110 The Tenth Circuit read
of §§ 1367(a) and (b).
the joinder and aggregation
section 1367(a) as having incorporated
that the district
requirements
its
rules of complete diversity into
of the claims in a civil accourt first obtain "original jurisdiction"
operate to prevent
[Tihe restrictions in section 1367(b)
tion ....
requirement that might otherthe erosion of the complete diversity
based
jurisdiction over these new claims
and the court could exercise supplemental
on the court's interpretation.
631, 640-41
Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d
102 See Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 222;
(10th Cir. 1998).
103 166 F.3d 214.
104 Id. at 216.
105 Id. at 222.
reads Rule 20
legislative history, Meritcare effectively
106 Id. With such reliance on
into the second grouping of § 1367.
107 160 F.3d 631.
arguments opposing sympathetic textualism,
108 See Pfander, supra note 65. For
(2005);
Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2621-22
see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Freer, supra note 63, at 79-85.
at 147-48. Justice
640-41; Pfander, supra note 65,
109 See Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at
mirrors sympawhich
1367,
§
of
her interpretation
Ruth Bader Ginsburg asserts that
Ailapattah, 125
the measure's legislative history."
thetic textualism, "does not rely on
legislasection's
the
cites
dissenting). However, she
S. Ct. at 2641 n.14 (Ginsburg, J.,
interpretaher
that
notes
and
id. at 2640 n.13,
4
id. at
tive history in her dissenting opinion,
history. Id. at 2641 n.1 (citing
legislative
the
with
accord
in
is
tion of § 1367
2628-31 (StevensJ., dissenting)).
Pfander, supra note 65, at 114.
110 See Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 639-40;
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wise result from an expansive application

.

.

. of ancillary

jurisdiction.' II

Because each plaintiff must satisfy the amount-in-controversy and
complete diversity requirements in order for a court to have original
diversity jurisdiction,' 12 the omission of Rules 20 and 23 from
§ 1367(b) do not work as an abrogation of Zahn or the complete diversity requirement. 13
Consequently, two different approaches emerged over the proper
method to interpret § 1367. One focuses solely on the text of the statute, and the other uses legislative history to inform its opinion. The
division among the circuits once again called the Supreme Court into
1 14
the area of supplemental jurisdiction.
III.

ALLAPATTA-:

CAUTION, DIALOGUE

AT WORK

Allapattah officially presents "the question [of] whether a federal
court in a diversity action may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the minimum amountin-controversy requirement, provided" some members of the class do
satisfy that requirement.' 1 5 Like Stromberg, the Court does not limit its
answer to the amount-in-controversy question presented; it looks
more fundamentally at the interaction between § 1367 and § 1332.' 16
The Court's analysis provides a window through which one may view
the Court's conception of its own power to determine the scope of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court first divorces its examination
from the statute's legislative history.1 1 7 Then, in an un-Finley-like analysis, the Court responds, through the guise of statutory interpretation,
with its own judgment on the proper scope of supplemental jurisdic111 Pfander, supra note 65, at 114; see also Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 639-40 (adopting
and explaining the sympathetic textualist interpretation of § 1367).
112 See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1973) (requiring each party
to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity). There is an exception to the general rule of complete diversity-in class actions, it is only applied against the named
plaintiffs. See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
113 See Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 641; Pfander, supra note 65, at 148-49.
114 The Supreme Court previously attempted to resolve the split in Free v. Abbott
Laboratories,Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam).
115 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005).
Thus, the key question here is the interaction between supplemental jurisdiction as
codified in § 1367 and the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Also, as discussed
in the previous part of this Note, the answer to this question will impact Rule 20
joinder.
116 See infra Part III.B.
117 See infra Part III.A.
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jurisdiction on the requirements
tion and the effect of supplemental
'1 8 As a result, the Court's reasoning in Alfor diversity jurisdiction.
Friedman's dialogic model.
lapattah provides support for Professor
A.

The Role of Legislative History

power and dialogic
A key distinction between the congressional
to congressional intent when conmodels is the judiciary's deference
The congressional power
fronted with questions of jurisdiction.
defer to congressional intent when
model demands that the Court
by
no such deference need be given
interpreting § 1367. Conversely,
' 19 The Allapattah Court's reasonthe Court under the dialogic model.
by the congressional power model.
ing lacks the deference predicted
much like the textualist inThe Supreme Court's interpretation,
use
of the circuit courts, rejects the
terpretation employed by several
relies solely on the text of the statute
of legislative history and, instead,120
According to the Court, legislative
to determine Congress's intent.
12 1 In Allapattah, for examhistory is often ambiguous or inaccurate.
not
statute's legislative history does
ple, the Court argues that the
of
intent to retain the holding
clearly indicate a congressional
the Court looks to the seeming
Zahn.122 To support its argument,
Federal Courts Study Committee
ambiguity in the Report of the
the parameters for what
("Study Committee"), which demarcated full committee did not enthe
would become § 1367.123 Even though
to overturn Zahn, the
4
sub-committee
its
by
dorse a recommendation
either12
recommendation
this
reject
explicitly
full committee did not
unable to reconcile the final
The Court finds itself in a dilemma,
the sub-committee's recommendaStudy Committee report with
See infra Part 1II.B.
totally ignore
does not mean that the Court need
119 As indicated in Part 1, this
model.
dialogic
the
with
order to be consistent
the congressional enactment in
con[its]
of
light
in
text
"examine the statute's
These
120 The Court notes that it must
at 2620.
provisions." Allapattah, 125 S. Ct.
text, structure, and related statutory
the provisions of
of
all
for
account
fully
to
unable
sources of insight, however, are
Part.
§ 1367 as shall be seen later in this
are
declines to hold that legislative materials
121 Id. at 2626. The Court explicitly
Id.
of congressional intent.
inherently unreliable as a source
122 Id. at 2626-27.
develop a
was established by Congress "'to
123 Id. at 2626. The Study Committee
COMM.,
STUDY
COURTS
Federal judiciary."' FED.
long-range plan for the future of the
100 Stat.
100-702,
No.
L.
Pub.
Act,
Courts Study
supra note 61, at 1 (quoting Federal
(1988)).
4644
4644,
124 Allapattah, 125 S.Ct. at 2626-27.
118
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tion. 125 Interestingly, though, the title page of the Study Committee's
Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports has the following disclaimer:
"In no event should the enclosed materials be construed as having
1 26
been adopted by the [full] Committee."

Additionally, the Court criticizes legislative history for being too
malleable. In furtherance of this argument, the Court cites the draft-

ers of § 1367. The authors of the statute freely acknowledged that
"'the legislative history was an attempt to correct the oversight"' in the
statute's text, which appears to signal Congress's displeasure with
Zahn.127 However, a qualitative difference exists between the authors
of a statute clarifying the language of their statute, on the one hand,
and lobbyists or rogue members of Congress surreptitiously inserting
comments in the legislative history to fundamentally alter its meaning
on the other.
Justice John Paul Stevens also makes a potent rejoinder to the
Court's second attack on the use of legislative history. The Court is
more constrained, according to Justice Stevens, when it restricts itself
to "all reliable evidence of legislative intent."12 8 Justice Stevens plays
on the ubiquitous, friend-in-the-room analogy to exemplify his point.
One may focus on select-segments of a statute's legislative history to
support his or her preferred interpretation of the statute just as one
may pick a select group of friends in a crowded room. In the end,
however, one is confined to that room. If the Court liberates itself
from reliable legislative history, it may ground its interpretation on
any external source it chooses, including its own policy preferences.
Finally, the Court argues, "[e]xtrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on
the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous
terms."' 129 The Court holds that "§ 1367 is not ambiguous."'13 0 There125 Id. at 2626-27. The Court has previously recognized that silence can be tantamount to approval in certain situations. See id. at 2619 (citing Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)). The impasse in which the Court finds itself in Allapattah
appears to be more man-made than genuine. Circuit courts adopting both the textualist and deferential approaches have acknowledged that the legislative history indicates Congress's desire to retain Zahn. See supra Parts II.B.3.a-b. But see Freer, supra
note 63, at 72-79. The legislative history clearly indicates that § 1367 "is not intended
to affect the jurisdictional requirements of [§ 1332 diversity jurisdiction] in diversityonly class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley." H.R. RP.
No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6875.
126 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61, at title page.
127 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2627 (quoting Rowe et. al., supra note 80, at 960 n.90).
128 Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 2626 (majority opinion).
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fore, even if congressional intent could be clarified by the statute's
history, its language would control.
In freeing itself from the section's legislative history, the Court
claims to restrict its search for congressional intent to the text of the
statute. 3 1 "As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is
the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material" 13 2 However, the Court's interpretation of § 1367 produces its
own quandary. It acknowledges that "the omission of Rule 20 plaintiffs from § 1367(b) presents something of a puzzle on [its] view of
1 33

the statute."

As an anticipatory response to criticism of its opinion on this
point, the Court asserts that other interpretations of § 1367 have similar difficulties.' 3 4 Notably, such a statement is in tension with the
Court's earlier pronouncement that § 1367 is not ambiguous. The dialogic model foresees a court's claim that it is merely interpreting a
vague statute when, in fact, the court is crafting its own judgment on
the proper scope of jurisdiction.
If language is as malleable as many scholars today take pleasure in
demonstrating... we then have a model of congressional primacy,
but by the same token, Congress seems to have all the authority of
the Crown of Great Britain. Under this interpretation Congress
gets the "last" word, but this is (of course) subject to the vagaries of
judicial interpretation of congressional will.""5
By limiting itself solely to a vague' 3 6 text, therefore, the Court
frees itself to approach this jurisdictional question, not as a willing
implementer, but as a partner with Congress. The Court, thereby,
takes a first, important step toward the dialogic method of analysis-it
130 Id. at 2625. This is consistent with the textualist approach discussed in Part
II.B.3.a. Recall, however, the Third Circuit in Meritcare opined that "[elven were we
to conclude that Section 1367 is unambiguous ... we would nevertheless turn to the
legislative history because this is one of those 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.'" Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins., Co., 166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir.
1999) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v, Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 313
(3d Cir. 1998)).
131 See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2626.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2624.
134 Id. at 2625.
135 Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply, supra note 8, at 481-82 (footnotes omitted).
136 Some clarification may be in order here. As stated previously, it is widely accepted that § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction beyond that sanctioned by
the Supreme Court in and prior to Finley. See supra Part II.B. As discussed in this
Note, the vagueness of the statute's text concerns the scope of that expansion.
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implicitly rejects the fundamental premise of congressional superiority that underlies the congressional power model.
B. Driving a Wedge in Diversity Jurisdiction
Released from the confines of congressional intent as expressed
in legislative history, the Allapattah Court is free to look at Congress's
contribution with the independence predicted by the dialogic model.
Unlike the Court's previous cases, Allapattah must be decided against
the backdrop of § 1367. As noted in Part II.B, this statute both endorses much of the Court's earlier jurisprudence and authorizes an
expansion of supplementaljurisdiction. The circuit courts recognized
that such an expansion could undermine the limiting functions of the
dual requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Though it professes otherwise, the Supreme Court's holding cannot be completely justified by
either the historical underpinnings of the amount-in-controversy and
complete diversity requirements or the texts of § 1367 or § 1332.
1. Historical Justifications for Amount-in-Controversy and
Complete Diversity
Jurists and legal scholars cite the fear of bias by a state against the
citizens of another state as the chief, historical justification for diversity jurisdiction. 13 Chief Justice John Marshall noted "'that the constitution itself either entertains the apprehensions [of bias] . . . or

views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of
suitors"' that it authorizes diversity jurisdiction.1 38 Judge Henry
Friendly provided numerous examples in his well-known history of diversity jurisdiction to support such fears of bias.139 "[A] careful read137 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 1454-56; Borchers, supra note 6, at 79;
Friendly, supra note 6, at 492. For additional justifications for diversity jurisdiction,
see FED. COURTS STuDY COMM., supra note 61, at 118 (summarizing Judge Richard
Posner's externality justification); id. at 419 (arguing that diversity jurisdiction also
serves to promote the visibility of the national government), To this day, scholars
debate the need for diversity jurisdiction.
138 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 1454 (quoting Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809)).
139 The selection of state judges in that era raised questions of judicial independence and reliability. "The method of appointment and the tenure of the [state]
judges were not of the sort to invite confidence ....
Nor were the practical workings
of the system better than one might expect." Friendly, supranote 6, at 497. For example, the judges of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors "I s] ometimes ... forsook
the bench and themselves pleaded before their fellow assistants. On other occasions

they appointed themselves judges of the lower courts and then reviewed their own
decisions." Id. at 497-98.
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ing of the arguments of the time," according to Judge Friendly, "shows
that the real fear was not of the state courts so much as of the state
legislatures.'

1 40

In response to political pressure, for instance, many

states enacted debtor relief laws,141 which subjected interstate lenders
42
in one state to the political whims of another.
After ratification of the Constitution, an "initial matter of busi'1 43
ness [by Congress] was to put the federal judiciary in order.'
Spurred by fears of bias, Congress authorized diversity jurisdiction
and created the still extant amount-in-controversy requirement in its
first Judiciary Act.144 Some scholars view the amount-in-controversy
requirement merely as a method of artificial docket control. 45 The
Supreme Court has also held this view and, as such, developed non-

The practices employed by the state judiciaries at that time could easily lead to
manipulation of trial procedures to benefit the state's resident. See Borchers, supra
note 6, at 86. "One recurring complaint about state courts was the delay that defendants (often debtors) could engineer to frustrate plaintiffs (often creditors). Federalists complained about delays of twenty to thirty years in prosecuting actions in the
state courts, a staggering time period even by modern standards." Id. at 95 (footnote
omitted).

140 Friendly, supra note 6, at 495. Some state legislatures became de facto courts
of last resorts and could, therefore, alter the holdings of lower courts based on popular will. For example, the legislature of New Hampshire "vacated judgments and annulled deeds alleged to have been obtained by fraud, and reversed convictions." Id.
at 498 (footnotes omitted).

141 See id. at 495. After the Revolutionary War, the nation experienced severe economic difficulties. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 87-88.
142 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 1454-56; Borchers, supra note 6, at
87-90. This justification has lost much of its weight in modern times due to the Erie
doctrine.
143 Borchers, supra note 6, at 98.
144 Even early drafts of the Act contained such amount thresholds. See Borchers,
supra note 6, at 99-102.
The required amount in controversy has been increased several times over the
years and currently stands at $7,500. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). The initial Act contained a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement. See Borchers, supra note 6, at
99-100. In 1887-88, Congress increased it to $2000. Since that time, Congress increased the requirement to $3,000 in 1911, to $10,000 in 1958, and to $50,000 in
1988. See William A. Braverman, Note, Janus was not a God of Justice: Realignment of
Parties in DiversityJurisdiction,68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1091 (1993).
145 See HART & WECH SLER, supra note 16, at 1473; FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., Supra
note 61, at 458-61; Rcn
POSNER, THE FEDE)RAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
92 (1996); Lloyd C. Anderson, The American Law Institute Proposal to Bring Small-Claim
State-Law Class Actions Within FederalJurisdiction:An Affront to Federalism that Should Be
Rejected, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 325, 331 (2002).
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aggregation rules to limit the situations in which the amount-in-con46
troversy requirement could be satisfied.'
The amount-in-controversy requirement is more than mere
docket control however. Judge Friendly's history indicated that the
requirement was of great import to the founding generation, particularly proponents of states' rights. 1 47 A number of Founders feared the
effect of diversity jurisdiction on state courts. Patrick Henry, for example, believed that diversity jurisdiction would ultimately lead to the
"'destruction of the state judiciaries.'"148 To limit the reach of diversity jurisdiction, several states, including Federalist states, proposed
constitutional amendments to add an amount-in-controversy require49
ment for diversity jurisdiction.1
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reasserts in Allapattah the traditional belief that the amount-in-controversy requirement is nothing
more than a form of docket control. 150 The Court, agreeing with the
textualist interpretation, holds that the statute overturns Zahn, which
required members of a diversity class action to independently satisfy
the amount-in-controversy requirement.' 5 1 While "flood control" is a
permissible interpretation of the mechanics by which the amount-incontroversy requirement operates, so simple a description does not
reflect the import of this requirement-to prevent federal encroachment on the traditional domain of state judiciaries.
While the Judiciary Act introduced the amount-in-controversy requirement in 1789, the Court did not recognize the complete diversity
146

See Anderson, supra note 145, at 331. Under this rule, "'claims of several plain-

tiffs, if they are separate and distinct, cannot be aggregated for purposes of determining the amount in controversy."' Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d
214, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3704, at 134 (1994)); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2636 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[I]n multiparty
cases, including class actions, we have unyieldingly adhered to the nonaggregation
rule stated in Troy Bank [v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911) 1.").
147 See generally Friendly, supra note 6 (summarizing history of Article III
ratification).
148 Id. at 489 (quoting 2 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OT1ER PROCEEDINGS, IN
CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 397 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., Washington 1828)).
149 See id. at 499. Massachusetts, for example, proposed a constitutional amountin-controversy requirement of $1,500. Id. Other states proposed substantive limits on
the ability to grant diversity jurisdiction or proposed the elimination of diversity jurisdiction altogether. Id.
150 At the outset of its opinion, the Court states the amount-in-controversy requirement "ensure [s] that diversity jurisdiction does not flood the federal courts with minor disputes." Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2617.
151 Id. at 2622.
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requirement until 1806. Chief Justice Marshall first articulated the
complete diversity rule in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.15 2 Although the Su-

preme Court initially rationalized Strawbridge as an interpretation of
§ 1332, Allapattahacknowledges the rule "is not mandated by the Constitution, . . . or by the plain text of § 1332(a). 15 3 Instead, Allapattah
asserts its adherence "to the complete diversity rule in light of the
purpose of the diversity requirement, which is to provide a federal
forum for important disputes where state courts might favor, or be
perceived as favoring, home-state litigants.'

5

4

If citizens from the

same state are on opposing sides of a dispute, the threat of bias, according to the Court, is dispelled, and, thus, the warrant for diversity
1 55
jurisdiction is substantially diminished.
The Court's justification is not completely satisfying. The constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction is founded on actual or potential bias in state courts and/or legislatures.1 5 6 Yet, the Constitution
only requires minimal diversity for federal jurisdiction. While complete diversity may be based on the justification for diversity jurisdiction, it does not occupy the whole field. In other words, the actual or
potential bias feared by the Founders may still occur, albeit with less
frequency, in minimal diversity cases. Much like amount-in-controversy, furthermore, complete diversity has an undeniable affect on a
court's docket. Complete diversity excludes those cases that, in the
Court's opinion, are less likely to raise fears of bias. In the end, then,
complete diversity works in the same manner as amount-in-controversy-"limiting the scope of diversity jurisdiction." 15 7 The Court
152 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Unlike the amount-in-controversy requirement,
then, this requirement for diversity jurisdiction does not appear until seventeen years
after the Judiciary Act.
153 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2617 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
154 Id. at 2617-18. The Court has previously protected the complete-diversity requirement. As Altapattah notes,
(ti he specific purpose of the complete diversity rule explains both why we
have not adopted Gibbs'expansive interpretiveapproach to this aspect of the jurisdictional statute and why Gibbs does not undermine the complete diversity
rule ....

Before the enactment of §1367, the Court declined in contexts

other than the pendent-claim instance to follow Gibbs' expansive approach
to interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes.
Id. at 2618 (emphasis added). But see supra note 91 (discussing the relaxation of the
complete diversity requirement for diversity class actions).
155 See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2618.
156 See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
157 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61, at 566; see also Howard P. Fink,
SupplementalJurisdiction-TakeIt to the Limit!, 74 IND. L.J. 161, 163 (1998) (acknowledging that removing the complete diversity rule would result in an inundation of
cases unless other measures were taken to reduce this influx); Rowe et at., supra note
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mechanics of the complete dicould have, therefore, focused on the
as a form of docket conversity rule and interpreted the rule simply
requirement,
trol. Unlike its holding for the amount-in-controversy
the federal judiciary to apply
however, the Supreme Court directed
case because "[incomplete
the complete diversity rule to the entire respect to all claims."1 58
with
diversity destroys original jurisdiction
should have on the scope
In grappling with the effect that § 1367
demonstrates the indepenof supplemental jurisdiction, Allapattah
model. As Justice Ruth Bader
dent analysis predicted by the dialogic
Ginsburg asserts in her Allapattah dissent,
diversity' rule . . . the
[e]ndeavoring to preserve the 'complete
between the two components of 28

Court's opinion drives a wedge
citizenship requirement as
U. S. C. § 1332, treating the diversity of
requirement as more readily
159
essential, the amount-in-controversy clear
why that should be so.
disposable....

It is not altogether

Court, as Justice Ginsburg
From a prima facie perspective, the
on the complete diversity rule
notes, places much more importance
requirement.
than the statutorily-mandated, amount-in-controversy
a
§ 1367 contain such hierarchy of
Of course, neither § 1332160 nor
for both requirements do not apimportance, and the justifications
Alternatively, if the Court
pear to warrant such disparate treatment.
traditional view of the two requireinterpreted § 1367 in light of its
proponents of the congressional
ments for diversity jurisdiction,
reconciling the Court's statements
power model would have difficulty
may alter either the amountwith the reasoning it employs. Congress
rule] encould abandon [the complete diversity
80, at 952-53 ("At an extreme, one
expansion in federal diversity jurisdiction,
tirely, which effects a potentially enormous
). While the Study Committee recom....
courts
threatening to swamp the federal
it favored retaining the complete diversity
mended eliminating diversity jurisdiction,
jurisdiction.
if Congress chose to retain diversity
rule because of its limiting function
566.
at
61,
note
See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra
district court
Under the Court's interpretation, a
158 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2618.
then look to
should
it
is,
diversity. If there
should first look to see if there is complete
requirement.
satisfies the amount-in-controversy
see if there is at least one claim that
those
the court has original jurisdiction for
satisfied,
also
is
do
If this second requirement
that
claims
under § 1367 for all additional
claims and supplemental jurisdiction
requirement.
not satisfy the amount-in-controversy
dissenting).
J.,
159 Id. at 2635 n.5 (Ginsburg,
two requirehowever, does not rank order the
160 See id. ("Section 1332 itself,
it fails to
because
hierarchy
a
contain such
ments."). Of course, the statute cannot
by many of the
rule. Given the great insistence
mention the complete diversity
as previously disrequirement,
Founding generation for an amount-in-controversy not, that the amount-in-controthis Note does

cussed, one could even argue, though
rule.
import than the complete diversity
versy requirement should be of greater
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in-controversy or complete diversity requirements by statute because
both are based on § 1332. According to the Allapattah Court, statutes
enacting such alterations need not speak with "extraordinary clarity in
order to modify the rules of federal jurisdiction."'16 1 However, § 1367
makes no explicit reference to either amount-in-controversy or complete diversity; instead, the statute refers jointly to 'jurisdictional requirements of Section 1332." Recall that Stromberg, which similarly
adopted the textualist approach, accepted the argument that § 1367
162
treats both requirements of diversity jurisdiction the same.
In treating the two elements of diversity jurisdiction so differently, the Court signals a partial disagreement with Congress over the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction. While the Court willingly accepts
the statute's text on the question of amount-in-controversy, it declines
the text's invitation to expand supplemental jurisdiction to the point
of endangering complete diversity. Despite the Court's espoused deference to congressional will, then, it introduces its own view of the
proper scope of supplemental jurisdiction.
Why would the Court so willingly act to diminish one requirement but not the other? A possible explanation is the efficiency justification that lies at the foundation of supplemental jurisdiction.
2.

Efficiency Interests Intersect Diversity Jurisdiction

Proponents of the dialogic model argue that the federal judiciary
has a "shared responsibility for evaluating the factors influencing the
use of federal courts."1 63 As Allapattah notes, "Congress had established the Federal Courts Study Committee to take up issues relating
1 64
to 'the federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and expansion.'
Just as Congress may consider judicial administration, the federal judiciary may also look to this factor when deciding questions of lower
court jurisdiction.
The Allapattah Court implicitly considers the efficient administration of federal courts in its analysis. In addressing potential opposition to its holding, the Court argues that "the presence of a claim that
falls short of the minimum amount in controversy does nothing to
reduce the importance of the claims that do meet this require161 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2620.
162 Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.
1996); see supra text accompanying note 91.
163 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 52. Judge Posner opines that "judicial economy is an accepted factor in judicial decision-making" when considering
questions of jurisdiction. POSNER, supra note 145, at 315.
164 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. COURTS
S-UDY CoMm., supra note 61, at 3).
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viewed as a reference to the effi5
ment.' 16 This statement may be
66
If the court considers an
ciency justification used in Gibbs.
because it satisfies the
underlying claim sufficiently important
the addition of a claim not satisamount-in-controversy requirement,
to reduce the original claim's
fying that requirement does nothing
efficient, according to the Court,
significance. Thus, it would be more
over those individual claims
to authorize supplemental jurisdiction
requirement and allow
that do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy
time.
the entire case to proceed at one
context of the complete diverHowever, a similar holding in the
of the
impact on the overall workload
sity requirement would have an
at
look
to
Allapattahdirects courts
federal courts. As previously noted,
the complete diversity requirethe entire case when they evaluate
will not be allowed to exercise sup7
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However, this counterargument still fails to take account of the
Court's independent analysis of the question presented in Allapattah.
First, § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction beyond that previously sanctioned by the Court. 17 5 If the counterargument is correct,

the statute would not prevent the Court from declining to exercise
most, if not all, of the additional supplemental jurisdiction authorized
by Congress depending on, for example, the vagaries of the judicial
workload. A rejection of the statute's expansive view of supplemental
jurisdiction runs contrary to the congressional power model's foundation of judicial deference.
Second, the Court's analysis is distinguishable from that used in
the counterargument. In Allapattah, the Court fails to hold that
§ 1367 abrogated both diversity requirements, and it failed to invoke
the provisions of subsection (c). Instead, the Court holds that the
statute makes a distinction between amount-in-controversy and complete diversity. This distinction, as previously discussed, does not appear on the face of the statute. It is difficult for a congressional power
proponent to reconcile the competing propositions that Congress occupies the superior position on questions of subject-matter jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court can so blatantly mischaracterize
congressional intent.
Consequently, the counterargument fails to alter this Note's conclusion that the Court's analysis in Allapattah is best predicted and
explained by the dialogic model.
IV.

INSIGHTS INTO THE

DIALOGIC MODEL

AND

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Professor Friedman developed the dialogic model to explain the
actual interaction between the federal judiciary and Congress on questions of jurisdiction. 176 The Court's reasoning in Allapattah and its
prior jurisprudence support Professor Friedman's model. The effectiveness of the dialogic model to explain both pre- and post-Finley
holdings encourages a re-examination of Finley. The Court's supple175 Per the legislative history of the section, Congress intended § 1367 to preserve
pre-Finley holdings while at the same time overturning Finley, See H.R. REP. No. 101734, supra note 60, at 6874. Thus, the section permits pendent-party jurisdiction,
which the Court refused to sanction in Finley. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs,, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2621 (2005).
176 See supra Part I.C. Professor Friedman also developed the dialogic model, in
part, to move questions to the forefront which, he believed, had been lost in the
continual back-and-forth in the strong and mandatory congressional power debate.
See Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply, supra note 8, at 492. However, this is beyond the scope
of this Note.
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mental jurisdiction jurisprudence also helps to clarify the similarities
and distinctions, noted in Part I, between Professor Friedman's dialogic model and Professor Shapiro's discretionary school.
A.

Finley in the Light of Allapattah

As indicated in Part II, the Court laid the modern foundation of
supplemental jurisdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.1 7 7 Without
reference to jurisdictional statutes, 178 the Court justified and defined
the scope of supplemental jurisdiction and permitted lower federal
courts to employ discretion when exercising this type of jurisdiction.1 7 9 Prior to Finley, therefore, the Court's myriad opinions provided evidence for the dialogic model. However, the Court's opinion
in Finley called into question this longstanding jurisprudence' 80 and
seemingly signaled the Court's support for the congressional power
model.
Allapattah undermines this interpretation of Finley. Because the
Court's pre- and post-Finley jurisprudence are better explained by the
dialogic model, Finley can be recast in light of that model as well. Despite its reiteration of congressional power, the Court's refusal to overturn Gibbs speaks volumes. The Court could, after all, have
overturned its previous precedents and merely waited for Congress to
authorize supplemental jurisdiction.
More narrowly, the question presented in Finley concerned the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction.1 8 1 In effect, the Finley Court refused to permit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over those
individuals seeking to join a suit even though they did not have an
original basis for jurisdiction. 18 2 However, the Finley Court explicitly
noted that Congress could abrogate the Court's holding if it chose to
do so. 83' Finley can be viewed, therefore, as an invitation for Congress
to enter a discussion on the proper scope of supplemental
jurisdiction.

177

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

178

See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.

179

See supra note 68 and accompanying text,

180

See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.

181

See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547 (1989).

182

See id. at 556.

183 See id. Again, it should be noted that the dialogic model does not presume
conflict among the branches.
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The Problem of Discretion Revisited

Additionally, the Supreme Court's supplemental jurisdiction jurisprudence clarifies the similarities and differences between Professor Friedman's model and Professor Shapiro's school of thought. As
noted in Part I, Professor Shapiro's discretionary approach is in tension with the bimodal construct developed by Professor Friedman.
This tension can be seen both in the timing of the branches' interaction and the scope of the judiciary's discretion. A reexamination of
Professor Shapiro's work in light of the analysis presented in this Note
brings greater clarity to the dialogic model and its interaction with the
discretionary school of thought.
The numerous examples cited by Professor Shapiro in his foundational article, Jurisdiction and Discretion, are really indicative of two
types of discretion. The first type occurs when the judiciary exercises
its discretion in a manner consistent with the purpose of the congressional act. Because jurisdictional grants tend to be over-inclusive, a
court may "fine tune" the congressional act in order to give effect to
the "central purpose of the jurisdictional grant."'1 4 Alternatively, Professor Shapiro cites examples in which the judiciary gives little
credence to congressional intent; instead, it uses discretion to give effect to its own perspective on the matter in question,1 8 5 The former
type of discretion is most closely associated with Professor Shapiro's
school of thought; the latter type of discretion is synonymous with the
dialogic model proffered by Professor Friedman) 8 6 At its base, consequently, Professor Shapiro's discretionary theory identifies an inherent power vested in the federal judiciary.18 7 Professor Friedman
grounds his model in this same inherent power. In fact, Professor
Shapiro asserts that "[aill of [his] examples illustrate the productive
dialogue that can occur between the courts and the legislature when
184 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 587.
185 For example, Professor Shapiro notes that the Supreme Court has imposed
limitations on the exercise of federal question jurisdiction despite evidence "that Congress intended the grant to be as broad as the Constitution allowed." Id. at 568.
Moreover, courts have exercised discretion in such a way as to make statutory restrictions on jurisdiction meaningless. "The broader language of the Anti-Injunction Act,
which dates back to 1793, evidences the same concern, although the Court has rather
blatantly construed the Act almost out of existence." Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
186 See, e.g., id. at 576 (discussing the Court's treatment of the Anti-Injunction
Act).

187 See id. at 586-87. Returning once again to the square-rectangle analogy, see
supra note 59, Professor Shapiro's analysis identifies additional examples of the court
acting outside of the square, or the congressional power model. As such, his analysis
lends support to the dialogic model.
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each recognizes the shared responsibility for defining the contours of
the judicial authority. Principles of separation and allocation of powers seldom involve rigid boundaries. " ' 3
An important distinction, though, between Professors Friedman
and Shapiro appears to be one of timing. Professor Shapiro's analysis
implies that Congress acts first through the adoption of a jurisdictional statute. The courts, then, have an opportunity to "fine tune"
the grant through their interpretation and implementation of the statute. If Congress does not support thejudiciary's interpretation, it has
the authority to override the decision. In this way, Professor Shapiro's
analysis appears more consistent with the congressional power model.
If a court can potentially disregard Congress's intent when interpreting a jurisdictional statute, however, the enactment of a statute seems
of little import. The Court's jurisprudence, as it evolved after Gibbs
and prior to the enactment of § 1367, demonstrates the judiciary's
power to shape jurisdiction pre-statutory enactment.
Was the Court's pre-Finlyjurisprudence a mere aberration that
Congress corrected through the enactment of § 1367?'18 Based on
the Court's analysis in Allapattah,the move from the common law-like,
pre-§ 1367 analysis to statutory interpretation has had little effect on
the Court's jurisprudence; it still approaches the question from its
own, unique perspective. To say, therefore, that § 1367 moved the
Court's jurisprudence from an unconstitutional usurpation of power
to a constitutionally permissible implementation of a jurisdictional
statute exalts form over reality.
CONCLUSION

Returning to the question presented at the beginning of this
Note, what is the relative power of the federal judiciary and Congress
to control lower federal court subject-matter jurisdiction? Much like
Hans Christian Andersen's tale, Professor Barry Friedman cautions,
"what the Court states rhetorically and what the vast body of Supreme
Court decisions indicated, are two completely different matters." 9 °
Unsatisfied with the Court's beautifully crafted jurisprudence, Friedman, unlike the fearful courtiers, questioned the Court's rhetoric. He
developed an analytical framework-composed of two models-to re188 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 577 (emphasis added). For example, a court could
exercise discretion and refuse to hear a certain class of cases. Under the legislative
supremacy principle, Congress could enact another statute to limit the court's discretion and, in effect, order it to hear such cases.
189 See supra text accompanying note 79.
190 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 9.
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solve this fundamental question. The congressional power model
most broadly contends that Article III grants Congress the ultimate
authority to determine the subject-matter jurisdiction of lower federal
courts. Dialogic model proponents, conversely, argue that a discourse
between the coequal branches actually determines the contours of
lower federal court subject-matter jurisdiction.
The development of supplemental jurisdiction demonstrates the
flexibility and collaboration articulated by the dialogic model. The
Court's early jurisprudence authorized federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and defined the contours of that jurisdiction.
Later, Finley v. United States urged Congress to enter into a dialogue
with the Court over the proper scope of supplemental jurisdiction.
Congress accepted this invitation and in fact entered into such a dialogue with the Supreme Court when it adopted § 1367. The Supreme
Court in Allapattah again exhibits the independence of thought predicted by the dialogic model. The Court divorced itself from congressional intent as indicated in the statute's legislative history and used its
own evaluation of the relative import of the dual diversity jurisdiction
requirements to shape its interpretation of § 1367. This history supports Professor Friedman's argument that the judiciary, like Congress,
has an independent basis of power through which it can influence the
scope ofjurisdiction. In the end, it is this give-and-take between these
independent, coequal branches that determines the proper scope of
lower federal court subject-matter jurisdiction.
While this Note cannot resolve the long-running debate on the
relative power of the judiciary and Congress to shape lower federal
court subject-matter jurisdiction, it does demonstrate that the evolution of supplemental jurisdiction provides additional support for Professor Barry Friedman's dialogic explanation of this fundamental,
constitutional question.

